The case of AD v. London Borough of Hackney  EWCA Civ 518 was recently heard by the culinary trio of Lords Justice Bean and Baker, and Mr Justice Cobb at the Court of Appeal. It is the latest in a series of unsuccessful legal challenges to local authority budget cuts affecting (or potentially affecting) special educational needs provision in England and Wales.
The Scottish Government guidance we have been looking at is called “Guidance on the presumption to provide education in a mainstream setting“, and yet it is only now – on page 13 of the document – that we reach consideration of the sometimes thorny issue of deciding on the right provision for a child or young person.
In this, the sixth part of a series on the Scottish Government (2019) Guidance on the presumption to provide education in a mainstream setting, we will be looking at the fourth and final of the “Key features of inclusion” : Supported.
Johann Lamont MSP recently launched a consultation on a proposed private member’s Bill in the Scottish Parliament. The consultation period for the Disabled Children and Young People (Transitions) (Scotland) Bill ended today (22 January 2020).
At age 16, the aspirations of disabled and non-disabled young people are broadly the same. By 26, however, disabled people are more likely to be out of work than their non-disabled peers, and are three times more likely to feel hopeless and to agree that “Whatever I do has no real effect on what happens to me”.
The Bill, as set out covers three main big ideas:
- A National Transitions Strategy;
- A Scottish Government Minister with special responsibility for transitions; and
- Transitions plans for every child and young person with a disability.
In principle, the Bill addresses some big issues, but I do think the details and structure proposed need some work.
My full consultation response can be found below.
In my earlier post on the Ashdown House School Case, I mentioned in passing, the enforcement powers of the Tribunal in Scotland:
Of course, in Scotland, the President of the Health and Education Chamber has specific powers to monitor the implementation of Tribunal decisions. In the event that such decisions are not implemented, a referral to the Scottish Ministers (who have enforcement powers and mechanisms in relation to both public and independent schools) may be made.
These powers have now been used for the first time since the Additional Support Needs Tribunals for Scotland were first set up (back in 2005). In a recent disability discrimination case, the child (who was the litigant in that case) complained that the education authority in question had not complied with the orders made by the Tribunal within their decision.
Rule 12 of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland Health and Education Chamber Rules of Procedure 2018 state:
Power to monitor implementation of First-tier Tribunal decisions
12. The Chamber President may, in any case where a decision of the First-tier Tribunal required an authority to do anything, keep under review the authority’s compliance with the decision and, in particular, may—
(a) require the authority to provide information about the authority’s implementation of the First-tier Tribunal decision;
(b) where the Chamber President is not satisfied that the authority is complying with the decision, refer the matter to the Scottish Ministers.
So, while it is true that the Scottish Ministers do have enforcement powers in relation to both public and independent schools, the powers of the President do seem to be limited to decisions affecting education authorities. They would not be available where the responsible body was the proprietor of an independent school. Apologies. I will amend the original article to reflect this.
In this case, however, the orders were made in relation to an education authority and the President, having first considered the authority’s information provided, and thereafter allowed a short period in which to further progress compliance with the decision, considered that the authority had not complied with the decision. She therefore took the unprecedented step of referring the matter to the Scottish Ministers.
So, what will the Scottish Ministers do now? Section 70 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 and Section 27(9) to (11) of the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004 both give the Scottish Ministers powers to require education authorities to take certain action in relation to their functions under the 2004 Act (in the latter case) and in relation to the 1980 Act or “any other enactment relating to education” (in the former).
Given that this case was a claim (under the Equality Act 2010) and not a reference (under the 2004 Act) it seems likely that the Scottish Government will use the Section 70 route. This now has a statutory procedure, set out in the Section 70 (Procedure) (Scotland) Regulations 2017, and would ultimately allow Scottish Ministers to declare the authority to be in default of their duties, and to require them to take specified action to remedy that default.
Given that there is the possibility for this process to be used in relation to most Tribunal decisions, those drafting orders should bear in mind the need for any requirements to be clear and specific – it should be obvious whether a decision has been complied with or not. Orders should also, in appropriate cases, come with time limits. Otherwise it can be difficult to know when a delay (or even an ongoing process) might be viewed as a failure to comply.
This is a significant development, and a reminder to claimants and appellants with a decision in their favour that there is a way in which the implementation of the decision can be monitored and – if necessary – enforced.
It will not have escaped your attention that there is a UK General Election campaign underway at the moment. IPSEA (Independent Provider of Special Education Advice) have released a manifesto asking the next Government to address a “SEND system in crisis”. SEND is an acronym for Special Educational Needs and Disability.
Now, IPSEA is an organisation which does not operate in Scotland, and education is a devolved issue, so this is not directly relevant to the situation north of the border. The education system and the ASL framework in particular has significant differences. However, it remains of interest to see what the position is like elsewhere in the UK, and to compare that to the Scottish situation, in relation to each of IPSEA’s 7 “asks”.
1. A robust system of accountability so that local authorities know there are serious consequences if they flout the law.
The complaint here is that SEN law seems to be disregarded with few consequences for local authorities. In Scotland, there are fairly well developed and reasonably accessible mechanisms for dispute resolution and for putting right things which have gone wrong at the time they do. It is far less straightforward to seek restitution for things which have happened in the past (even in the relatively recent past).
IPSEA mention the ability of a family to pursue a complaint to the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman (LGSCO) – and indeed there are examples of compensation being recommended by the Ombudsman in SEND cases.
In Scotland, the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO) generally refuses complaints related to additional support needs, as these should be dealt with by the Tribunal or other statutory mechanism instead. It can, in theory, recommend compensation, but basically doesn’t. Professional negligence claims in education cases are difficult legally, and vanishingly rare. All in all, it remains the case (as IPSEA state) “so much of the burden is placed on parents when things go wrong”.
One “simple fix” would be to give disabled pupils facing discrimination at school the right to seek compensation (including damages for “injury to feelings”) in the same way that disabled persons facing discrimination in any other field can do, and that pupils facing any other form of discrimination can do. This would require the amendment of the Equality Act 2010, so it is a matter for the UK Government, and therefore this election, even in relation to Scotland.
Why is it – uniquely among victims of unlawful discrimination – that disabled school pupils are prevented from seeking compensation for the wrongs done to them?
2. Better joined up working across education, health and social care, particularly during the EHC needs assessment process.
There is no doubt that this is an issue in Scotland as well. A Co-ordinated Support Plan is required only where there is a need for co-ordination of support, but it can often be difficult to get “appropriate agencies” to contribute, attend meetings etc.
Is there an opportunity for a revised, statutory Child’s Plan scheme (freed from the shackles of the Named Person debacle) to facilitate this joined up working for children and young people with additional support needs?
3. Mandatory SEND law training for all those involved in assessing and meeting the needs of children and young people with SEND. The national qualification for SENCOs should also include a module on the SEND law framework.
I am a lawyer, and often deliver ASL law training to those involved in assessing and meeting the needs of children and young people with additional support needs. So, I clearly think it has its place – I would probably say that it’s not anyone’s top priority though.
The SQA recognise and certify HNC and HND courses in Additional Support Needs. While the HNC is described thus, “Candidates may work or wish to work as an assistant within a mainstream or specialised school”, there is no national or required qualification for Support for Learning Assistants in Scotland.
4. The extended powers of the SEND Tribunal currently being trialed under the national trial for a single route of redress should be made permanent, but also strengthened so that the Tribunal can make binding orders in relation o children and young people’s health and social care needs and provision.
SEND Tribunals are currently in the midst of a two-year national trial. During this time (April 2018 to March 2020), SEND Tribunals can make non-binding recommendations on:
- the health and social care needs specified in EHC plans;
- the health and social care provision specified in EHC plans related to the learning
difficulties or disabilities that result in the child or young person having SEN; and/or
- the social care provision specified in EHC plans that is made under Section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970.
There are no current plans to confer similar powers on the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland (Health and Education Chamber), even on a trial basis. Perhaps the assessment of the trial period in England will prompt consideration of extended powers in Scotland, too.
5. Stronger guidance on SEN Support to ensure there is clarity over how children should be supported at this level and what good quality SEN Support looks like.
It is a difficult task to describe “what good quality SEN Support” looks like as it is, inevitably, going to vary from child to child, even where children share a diagnosis. “Supporting Children’s Learning”, the Code of Practice in Scotland, is being revised at the moment, and already contains some very useful examples illustrating the variety of approaches needed to meet the diversity of needs encompassed by the broad term “additional support needs”.
6. The jurisdiction of the LGSCO should be extended to enable it to investigate complaints about schools who fail to deliver SEN Support.
In Scotland, I feel that the process of independent adjudication effectively fills this role. Regular visitors to the blog will know that I am a fan of this system. The main problem is a simple lack of awareness.
7. Adequate funding to ensure that all children and young people with SEND receive the support they need to meet their individual needs whether that’s under SEN Support or through an Education, Health and Care plan.
It’s hard to argue with a call for “adequate funding” – agreeing what level of funding is actually adequate is another question. One point to note is that any additional funding for SEN Support in England would, in terms of the “Barnett consequentials“, result in a corresponding increase in the Scottish budget, though it would be for the Scottish Government (or potentially Scottish local authorities) to decide whether or not any such increase would go to additional support for learning.
Scottish Parliamentary elections are due to take place in 2021. Perhaps organisations working across the additional support needs sector in Scotland should even now be thinking about a similar manifesto?
I bring news of an interesting disability discrimination case involving an independent school in England. The case was determined by the Upper Tribunal, which is basically the appeal route as exists in Scotland from the Health and Education Chamber (previously known as the Additional Support Needs Tribunals).
The case is that of Ashdown House School v. JKL & MNP (not their real names!) and involved a pupil who was referred to for the purposes of the case as “Bobby”.
The facts of the case
Bobby was ten years old and a pupil at Ashdown House School, who has ADHD, sensory processing difficulties and emotional and social difficulties arising from trauma in his early childhood and in the womb. He is a disabled person in terms of Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.
He was permanently excluded from the School on 9 February 2019. He was excluded for aggressive behaviour, including placing another pupil in a headlock and what the school describes as “37 incidents of unprovoked aggression”. The school admitted that the exclusion amounted to unfavourable treatment, but maintained that the exclusion was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The aim in this case was to ensure the health and safety of staff and pupils at the school. For their part, the parents accepted that this was a legitimate aim, but not that the school had acted proportionately.
The Tribunal (at first instance) found that the exclusion was not proportionate, and was therefore unlawful discrimination. This was for a number of reasons. The Tribunal found that while the school had made a number of reasonable adjustments, there were other reasonable adjustments which could have been made (including anger management sessions, consulting with the local authority, and allowing parents to seek a review of Bobby’s Education, Health and Care Plan (EHCP), or seeking advice from CAMHS regarding his medication). The Tribunal also found that the exclusion came “like a bolt out of the blue” in that neither pupil nor parents had been warned it was a possible consequence of the incidents. There was also evidence that other violent incidents within the school (involving other, non-disabled pupils) had been dealt with less severely.
The Tribunal ordered Bobby’s immediate readmission, and that the school formally apologise to Bobby.
The school appealed to the Upper Tribunal.
Legal questions arising on appeal
In considering the appeal, the Upper Tribunal had to consider four discrete points:
- Does the First-tier Tribunal (SENDIST) have the power to order reinstatement of an excluded pupil to school?
- How can decisions of the First-tier Tribunal (SENDIST) be enforced, if not by the Tribunal itself?
- In the light of the courts’ traditional reluctance to order specific performance of contracts involving personal service/contact or supervision, is an order to reinstate a pupil at an independent school (in terms of a contract between the parents and the school) appropriate?
- Is it appropriate to order an apology in special educational needs and disability (SEND) cases?
The Upper Tribunal’s decision
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal, and Bobby was – ultimately – allowed to return to school. I understand that he also received his apology.
The school argued, that in the case of an independent school, the Tribunal would be restricted to making a declaration of discrimination, and making recommendations for the school to consider. The Upper Tribunal rejected this argument. The wording of the Act permits Tribunal to make such order as it thinks fit (excluding an order for payment of compensation). This wording obviously includes a power to order reinstatement.
At some considerable length, the Upper Tribunal considers how one of its decisions might be enforced, if not complied with.
Although the Tribunal itself does not have the power to enforce its own decisions in that regard, one of the parties to the action can rely on the inherent power of the High Court to commit for contempt of court in the event of non-compliance with the order or the [Equality and Human Rights Commission] may itself take proceeding under s.24 of the 2006 Act to achieve the same end. The School, however, is not amenable to judicial review because it is not a public body and in expelling the pupil it was not exercising public law functions.
Of course, in Scotland, the President of the Health and Education Chamber has specific powers to monitor the implementation of Tribunal decisions. In the event that such decisions are not implemented, a referral to the Scottish Ministers (who have enforcement powers and mechanisms in relation to both public and independent schools) may be made.
Edit – while it is true that the Scottish Ministers do have enforcement powers in relation to both public and independent schools, the powers of the President under Rule 12 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules do seem to be limited to decisions affecting education authorities. They would not be available where the responsible body was the proprietor of an independent school. Apologies. In such cases, a parent or pupil might approach the Scottish Ministers directly (or the Registrar of Independent Schools) to progress their complaint.
The Upper Tribunal determined that while the Tribunals should have regard to the historic reluctance of the courts to impose specific performance of a contract which involves personal service and supervision, and the reasons for that reluctance, this did not preclude the Tribunal from making such an order in appropriate circumstances.
The Upper Tribunal suggested that it would be “sensible for a Tribunal considering a disability discrimination claim in the future to consider matters such as whether it is practicable to make an order for reinstatement and, in cases where the applicant has caused or contributed to the expulsion, whether it would be just to order reinstatement.”
In finding that an order for an apology was appropriate in these circumstances, the Upper Tribunal set out the following guidance for future cases (likely to be relevant in Scottish cases, too) repeated largely verbatim below:
- The Tribunal does have the power to make an order for an apology.
- An apology may have a wider purpose than merely preventing further discrimination against the child in question. To the extent that an apology is an assurance as to future conduct, an order that there be an apology gives teeth to a declaration of unlawful discrimination.
- There can be value in an apology: apologies are very important to many people and may provide solace for the emotional or psychological harm caused by unlawful conduct. An apology might reduce the mental distress, hurt and indignity associated with a permanent exclusion. It might also assist with recovery, forgiveness and reconciliation. An order that there be an apology can be regarded as part of the vindication of the claimant.
- A tribunal should consider whether the apology should more appropriately be made to the child or to their parents. In the case of very young children the latter may be more appropriate for obvious reasons.
- An order to make an apology may well be appropriate when there is already an acceptance that there has been discrimination or unlawful conduct.
- However, the fact that there has been a contested hearing and that the respondent has strenuously disputed that there has been any discrimination or unlawful conduct is not decisive against ordering an apology.
- Nevertheless, particularly where there has been a dispute or a contested hearing, the tribunal should always consider whether it is appropriate to make an order and bear in mind that it may create resentment on one side and an illusion on the other, do nothing for future relations and may make them even worse.
- Before ordering an apology, a tribunal should always satisfy itself that it will be of some true value.
- A tribunal should always be aware that there may be problems of supervision if it accepts responsibility for overseeing the terms of the apology which can result in drawn out arguments over wording.
The decision of the Upper Tribunal in this case is likely to be of interest and use in a number of Scottish cases, especially those involving questions of admission and exclusion to an independent school. However, the points of guidance on the question of an apology are of broader application and I anticipate will be widely cited within the Health and Education Chamber.
One thing I come across from time to time is the application of “Unacceptable Actions Policies” by education authorities to parents raising concerns about their children’s additional support needs.
Typically, this might be used where an education authority have concerns about the frequency or nature of complaints made to school or other staff by a particular parent. Where used, the effect would usually be to restrict the ways in which a parent is allowed to make contact with the school. For example, they might be given a specific person to contact, and asked to do so only by e-mail. Some examples might mean a parent is asked not to attend the school premises, except by prior arrangement – which can extend to not attending to drop off or pick up the child at school.
In considering this issue further, I have had a look at the policy in place for Glasgow City Council. This is not because Glasgow are any worse than anyone else in this regard, but simply as they happen to the Council involved in the most recent case I looked at. Fair play to Glasgow, it must be said, for making the policy freely and easily accessible on their website. I also looked at decisions of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO) I was able to find which were relevant to this type of policy.
Glasgow’s policy specifies three different types of unacceptable actions by customers:
- Aggressive or Abusive Behaviour;
- Unreasonable Demands; or
- Unreasonable Persistence.
Aggressive or Abusive Behaviour
The policy helpfully distinguishes between anger (which it implicitly recognises may be justified) and aggression (which is not). I have some slight concern that “it is sufficient for staff to feel afraid, threatened or abused for the council to consider a customer’s behaviour or actions unacceptable”. This appears to be the case regardless or whether it is objectively reasonable for the member of staff to feel that way. To give an extreme example, a staff member who felt threatened simply due to a parent’s stature and racial origin is surely not the sort of thing the policy intends to cover. It also means that any declaration that staff felt threatened is effectively taken at face value without any enquiry into the circumstances of the case.
However, these are fairly extreme examples, and this section is by and large unobjectionable.
This covers things like insisting on speaking to a particular member of staff, continuing to raise the same issue in the hope of eliciting a different response, focusing on a “trivial” matter, insisting that a response is not adequate in spite of “a large volume of correspondence”. Such things amount to unacceptable actions if they start to take up too much staff time.
We are clearly into much more subjective territory here, and possibly in danger of categorising understandable (and often necessary) parental advocacy as unacceptable. Of course, the expectation is that the Council will apply the policy reasonably, but it leaves much effectively to the discretion and viewpoint of staff against whom (or against whose colleagues) complaints may be being made.
“The way in which these customers approach us may be entirely reasonable, but it is their persistence in continuing to do so that is not.”
Basically, the Council reserve the right here to cease engagement with a customer on an issue at the point the matter is referred to the SPSO, or otherwise reaches the end of a complaints or other process. Which is, in most cases, going to be fair enough.
Let’s have a look at some real life examples, as considered by the SPSO…
SPSO Decision 201806323, Glasgow City Council
In this instance, the Council placed restrictions on Ms. A under their policy. However, in doing so, they failed to let her know about her right to appeal against that decision, they failed to let her know what conduct of hers had led to the decision, they failed to keep proper records indicating their reason for imposing the restrictions, and they failed to review the decision on a six monthly basis (as their policy required).
While the SPSO were keen to point out that “The Council are entitled to apply their UAP” and that “we are not an appeal route for that decision”, they did uphold the complaint against the Council and made a series of recommendations to improve the operation of the policy in future.
SPSO Decision 201702414, East Dunbartonshire Council
The Council’s policy was applied in this case due to correspondence from Mr. C placing unreasonable demands on the business of the Council. The Council, however, confirmed that they did not / could not consider properly made Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to fall within the category. As they have a statutory duty to comply with same, these could not be regarded as imposing unreasonable demands.
However, the Council were then unable to produce to the SPSO much in the way of non-FOI correspondence. The SPSO therefore found that Council had unreasonably applied their policy in this case.
SPSO Decision 201701620, Aberdeenshire Council
The complaint in this case (made by Mr & Mrs C) was not upheld. The Council had followed its own process correctly. They had identified the conduct they felt was unreasonable, and had warned that it may lead to the policy being invoked. They had written to clearly explain the restrictions being imposed, and explained the process for reviewing the decision (at least every three months).
SPSO Decision 201306096, Glasgow City Council
This complaint was upheld in part. The SPSO determined that the application of the policy to Mr. A had taken place after proper consideration had been given to the nature and frequency of his communication with staff. There was no evidence that the Council had been inconsistent or that they had been unreasonable in not inviting Mr. A to meetings regarding the care of his child.
However, the process for review of the decision had not been properly followed, and the complaint about the policy itself had been delayed. Appropriate recommendations on these points were made.
SPSO Decision 201407836, Scottish Borders Council
While not upholding a complaint by a member of the public who had been turned away from a public event duet to his behaviour, the SPSO did recommend (for the sake of completeness) that the witness to the incident identified by Mr. C be contacted to see whether their testimony would have an effect on the decision.
SPSO Decision 201202410, Glasgow City Council
The SPSO found that the complainer in this case met the criteria for bringing the policy into effect – in terms of her behaviour and demands (which were related to complaints on noise). While the Council would no longer respond to her e-mails or phone calls, they had left open a means by which she could complain about anti-social behaviour or noise, and had continued to receive and respond to her letters.
As we might expect from the SPSO, these focus largely on procedural elements. They are nonetheless a useful reminder of the need for clarity in why a policy is being applied, the issueing of a warning beforehand, and the ability to access processes for appeal and/or review of the decision.
One important postscript to all of this is to bear in mind Section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 which forbid discrimination by way of victimisation. The legislation designates complaints that a person or body had breached the 2010 Act as protected acts. It is unlawful for an education authority to subject someone to a detriment due to them making an allegation of unlawful discrimination (whether they refer to the Act or not). So, a parent making allegations to a school of unlawful disability discrimination (e.g. a failure to provide reasonable adjustments for a disabled child) should not be subject to any kind of detriment (e.g. having their contact with the school restricted). The same protection applies to bring court of Tribunal proceedings under the Act, or being a witness in such proceedings. The protection of the Act does not apply to false allegations which are made in bad faith.
Here is an example of these provisions being used in relation to allegations of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief under older equivalent legislation: Council pays out in school religion row.
There are no equivalent protections under the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004, although it may be argued that in many cases, an allegation of failure under the 2004 Act for a disabled pupil, will also amount (in effect) to an allegation of unlawful disability discrimination – and therefore be protected in the same way.
Back to school, and the return of the school run. For many children this will mean travelling in vehicles (usually buses or taxis) arranged for them by the school or education authority.
This school year marks the beginning of the requirement for the publication of annual seatbelts statements. As of 1 August 2019 (or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter) each school authority (i.e. education authority, proprietor of an independent school, or managers of a grant-aided school) must publish a seatbelts statement. This sets out what steps the authority has taken to comply with the seatbelts duty and to promote and to assess the wearing of seat belts by pupils carried by the authority’s dedicated school transport services.
The principal duty, which has been in force since 1 August 2018 for new school transport contracts, and will apply from 1 August 2021 for any remaining existing school transport contracts is as follows:
A school authority must ensure that each motor vehicle which the authority provides or arranges to be provided for a dedicated school transport service has a seat belt fitted to each passenger seat.
This covers both home/school transport and transport used for school trips, sporting events, residentials etc.
The Scottish Government has published guidance for schools: Seat Belts on School Transport (Scotland) Act 2017 – Guidance – which includes a template for the annual seat belt statement.
Of course, pupils with additional support needs make up a goodly proportion of those requiring school transport. The guidance notes that:
Some pupils travelling on dedicated school transport may need specialist provision, such as smaller children needing a height-adjustable seatbelt, adjustable straps, lap belts, or adaptations which are required because a young person has Additional Support Needs. The Scottish Government recognises that school authorities, particularly local authorities, are better placed to conduct needs assessments in line with their existing obligations regarding education provision more generally and to make provision or enter into contractual arrangements to allow for this.
There’s not much in the guidance on this topic (in fact, it’s basically just this) but there are two assumptions which seem to run through this paragraph. First, school authorities should conduct needs assessments in relation to adaptations required for pupils with additional support needs to use school transport. Second, those adaptations should be made (either directly, or by ensuring that any contract for transport requires them to be made). This is broadly in line with the reasonable adjustments duty for disabled pupils under the Equality Act 2010.
Last week the Scottish Government published revised guidance on school attendance.
The guidance is called Included, Engaged and Involved Part 1: A Positive Approach to the Promotion and Management of Attendance in Scottish Schools. As the name suggests, there is an immediate link being made here with school exclusion – Part 2 of the “Included, Engaged and Involved” is the exclusions guidance (which is, by and large, very good). Anyone who has read the Not Included, Not Engaged, Not Involved research will know the very real overlaps between non-attendance at school and informal exclusions from school for disabled pupils / pupils with additional support needs.
I come across issues of attendance and non-attendance in my capacity as a solicitor and also as a member of a local attendance council for a Scottish local authority. More often in the first capacity, the situation is that a child with additional support needs is “not coping” with school and this is manifesting itself in behaviour which makes it not safe for them to attend, or in a refusal to attend school – often expressed in very definite terms.
Note already the terminology used – it is the child who is not coping, rather than the school environment (say) or teacher practice (for example) which requires amendment.
Pupils with additional support needs have a lower rate of attendance than pupils with no additional support needs, with the difference being particularly stark in mainstream secondary schools (88.6% compared to 92.1%) 2017 stats. Given this known disparity, it is disappointing that the section on Additional Support for Learning occupies half of one page (in a fifty page document). There are four paragraphs, three of which explain what additional support needs means as a term and a little bit about Co-ordinated Support Plans.
The other paragraph, however, does sort of get to the heart of matters (in all fairness):
Providing additional support may help children and young people to engage more fully with school and promote good attendance. Schools should recognise that poor attendance can often be related to, or be an indication of, an additional support need and they should use their staged intervention processes to ensure that any barriers to learning are identified and appropriate support is provided.
My concern is that this gets lost in a document which has much more to say about the traditional means of responding to absence: work being sent home; attendance orders; references to the children’s panel; and prosecution of the parents of the absent child (five pages devoted to the “Measures for compulsory compliance” appendix!). None of which is helpful or effective in relation to a child whose autism means that they are unable to function effectively (let alone learn) in the busy environment of a large mainstream school. These systems were set up decades ago to deal with truancy and are ill-suited to other purposes. Further, once you are in the enforcement process, it is difficult to get out.
Fortunately, the Tribunals – and the Court of Session, in the 2018 Inner House case of City of Edinburgh Council v. R, may take a more considered view of this type of case. The case deals with some fairly technical matters under the Equality Act 2010, but ultimately has no difficulty with the Tribunal’s finding that a CSP for a disabled child refusing to attend school (for reasons arising from that disability) which basically says the school can do nothing until the child attends school – was inadequate, detrimental and discriminatory.