Case Summary: Aberdeenshire Council v. CD (Upper Tribunal for Scotland)

This is an interesting case concerning the criteria for determining which children or young persons require a Co-ordinated Support Plan (CSP).

Section 2 of the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004 sets out the criteria as follows:

For the purposes of this Act, a child or young person requires a plan (referred to in this Act as a “co-ordinated support plan”) for the provision of additional support if-

(a) an education authority are responsible for the school education of the child or young person,

(b) the child or young person has additional support needs arising from-

(i) one or more complex factors, or

(ii) multiple factors,

(c) those needs are likely to continue for more than a year, and

(d) those needs require significant additional support to be provided-

(i) by the education authority in the exercise of any of their other functions as well as in the exercise of their functions relating to education, or

(ii) by one or more appropriate agencies (within the meaning of section 23(2)) as well as by the education authority themselves.

Section 2(1), Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004

The meaning of this provision, and of its four criteria, has already been the subject of much discussion. Some of the criteria are more straightforward than others.

The criterion set out in Section 2(1)(d) tends to be the one which is the hardest to pin down, and has needed the most in the way of judicial interpretation. Of particular note is the case of JT v. Stirling Council [2007] CSIH 52, which more or less settled the correct approach to deciding whether particular support(s) can be considered as “significant” or not.

This case considered the question of what the modifier “significant” applies to in the first place.

CD’s request for a CSP

CD is a pupil in a mainstream secondary school. With the assistance of an advocacy worker from the national children’s support service, My Rights, My Say, he made a formal request to his education authority (Aberdeenshire Council) to determine whether he required a CSP. The education authority decided that he did not.

There was no dispute over subsections 2(1)(a) to (c). It was accepted that these criteria were met. However, the education authority decided that 2(1)(d) did not apply. It was (more or less) accepted that the child required significant additional support from the education authority in the exercise of their education functions. The education authority, however, found that the additional support the child required from social work and health services was not significant.

This then, was at the heart of the matter. Should the Tribunal be considering whether the additional support required (across education and the other agencies) was significant? Or should it consider separately whether the additional support from education was significant and – in addition – whether the additional support from the other agency or agencies was significant. At the First-tier Tribunal (Health and Education Chamber), the first was described as being a “cumulative approach” and the latter as being a “non-cumulative approach” (although the Upper Tribunal did not adopt these terms).

At the First-tier Tribunal, a cumulative approach was adopted, and the education authority were ordered to prepare a CSP for the child. In fact, the Tribunal decided that he would be eligible for a CSP under either approach in any event. This means that the Upper Tribunal appeal which was lodged by the education authority would not have an effect of whether or not CD should have a CSP, but it would certainly have an impact on whether other children and young persons will receive such plans.

As Lady Poole (the Upper Tribunal Judge) notes: “CSPs benefit pupils for whom they are necessary, but they also place burdens on education authorities with finite resources” (pg 2, para 2).

It therefore matters, both for children and young people with additional support needs, but also for education authority finance officers, which approach is correct.

The correct approach

In the end, the decision for the Upper Tribunal was a relatively easy one.

My decision is that the FTS ought to have concluded that in order to meet the criterion in section 2(1)(d), as well as the pupil requiring significant additional support from the education authority, the pupil also had to require significant additional support either from the local authority exercising functions other than education or from one or more appropriate agencies.

Aberdeenshire Council v. CD [2023] UT 28, per Lady Poole at para 10

You can read the full decision here: Aberdeenshire Council v. CD [2023] UT 28

The Upper Tribunal was satisfied that the ordinary meaning of the words “as well as” as used in subsections 2(1)(d)(i) and (ii) was that both sets of additional support had to be significant.

This was held to be consistent with intention of the Scottish Parliament. While it was conceded that “It may be that co-ordination of services would be of assistance, even if services provided by a body external to the education authority are not ‘significant’ ..” it was held that the formal, statutory document of a CSP was intended only “for those with the most extensive co-ordination and support needs”. It was held that this approach “is likely to channel CSPs to cases where there is an increased need to co-ordinate services from different services.”

While the specific issue in this case had not been considered before, the approach adopted by the Upper Tribunal was consistent with statements made by the Inner House of the Court of Session in other cases considering questions of eligibility for a CSP. Even though the point may not have been argued, there was “a consistent assumption common to all of [the cases] which has endured since shortly after the 2004 Act came into force .. It is appropriate that this clear and consistent body of caselaw is followed, rather than the FTS taking a different approach.”

Finally, the preferred approach was consistent with the Code of Practice which, while not binding on the Upper Tribunal, would need a good reason to depart from its provisions. In the view of the Upper Tribunal “insufficient reasons are available in this particular case to depart from the relevant parts of the Code of Practice.”

Additional comments

As sometimes happens, having made the decision, the Upper Tribunal went on to make some more general comments – in this case about Co-ordinated Support Plans. The comments are extremely helpful, and so I am taking the time to summarise them here for you. As the Upper Tribunal notes: “CSPs can be of great benefit to a person with additional support needs and their families, so it is important the statutory criteria are applied properly.”

The Upper Tribunal first noted that just over 241,000 pupils in Scotland have additional support needs (approx. one third of the total pupil population). Of those pupils, only 1,401 have CSPs (i.e. around 0.2% of all pupils). It has been noted elsewhere that while the numbers of pupils with additional support need has been increasing year on year, the numbers of co-ordinated support plans, paradoxically, have been dropping year on year. (cf. “Vital support plans for pupils ‘disappearing'” The Herald, 2019)

  1. The Upper Tribunal notes that the wording of section 2(1)(d) is “those needs require significant additional support to be provided”. That is, what does the child or young person require – not what are they being provided with, or what has been offered. The answers to these questions may differ. As the UT notes “an approach that analyses only support that has in fact been provided, rather than what needs ‘require’, may in some cases be too narrow”. In my experience, all too often an education authority’s pro forma enquiry to appropriate agencies asks only what is being provided. This needs to change.
  2. The Upper Tribunal reiterates the well established approach to determining whether support is “significant” or not – it “is to be judged by reference to the need for co-ordination, with attention being paid to frequency, nature, intensity and duration of the provision of support, and the extent to which the support is necessary for achievement of educational objectives”. This is a useful restatement of the test, underlining the centrality of the need for co-ordination, and the multi-factorial nature of the test. The Upper Tribunal goes on to observe that the term significant “is not intended as an impossibly high standard”.
  3. The decision is clear that there should be no “cumulative approach” or summing-up of support across education and other services. However, the Upper Tribunal confirms the Code of Practice’s approach, which is to take a cumulative approach in determining whether there is significant additional support from sources external to the education authority. “The totality of support required from providers external to the education authority exercising education functions should be considered, in order to determine if it amounts to significant additional support.”

Conclusion

From a pupils’ rights point of view, the decision is a disappointing one, as the opposite decision would likely have led to a substantial increase in the numbers of pupils receiving a CSP. However, I think it is the correct decision, given the wording of the section, the Inner House authority and Code of Practice. And, in its concluding comments, the Upper Tribunal has provided some useful guidance for education authorities which, if followed, should avoid some children with additional support needs being incorrectly refused a CSP.

Photo credit: sweetlouise via Pixabay

Case summary – Midlothian Council v PD and PD v Midlothian Council (Upper Tribunal for Scotland)

Back in October 2019, I blogged on a decision on permission to appeal in this case (cf. Case summary – Midlothian Council v. PD). As you’ll remember, permission to appeal was granted and the decision on the appeal has now been published on the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service website.

The appeal was granted, and the case has been sent back to a new First-tier Tribunal (Health and Education Chamber) to hear the case afresh.

Many of the same issues canvassed at the permission to appeal hearing are covered again in this decision (unsurprisingly). As before, I’ll attempt to cover the main points which might be of more general application.

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Case summary – Aberdeen City Council v. LS (Upper Tribunal for Scotland)

There are a number of differences between the systems of education in Scotland and England. One of those is the existence of specialist colleges for young people with learning difficulties and/or disabilities. Another is the tradition of Sixth Form Colleges. The question which arose in this case was whether pupils with additional support needs in Scotland could access this kind of provision elsewhere in the UK.

As you may know, the system of making placing requests includes, for pupils with additional support needs, the ability to make a request for “a school in England, Wales or Northern Ireland the managers of which are willing to admit the child and which is a school making provision wholly or mainly for children (or as the case may be young persons) having additional support needs”.

In this case, the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland (Health and Education Chamber), had determined – as a preliminary issue – that the specialist college in question did count as a “school” under the above definition. This meant that LS, the young person, could make a placing request to the specialist college in question. It also means that a refusal (or deemed refusal) of that placing request could be appealed to the Tribunal.

The Council appealed against this decision. There is quite a lot in the detail of the Upper Tribunal decision (Aberdeen City Council v. LS [2021] UT 1) here, but to provide the broad sweep, I will try to simplify.

  • The Upper Tribunal rejected the appeal points raised by the Council and upheld the original Tribunal’s decision. That is, the UT confirmed that the specialist college in this case could be counted as a school for the purposes of a placing request. The Council argued that it should not be because of the age of the students (16+) and the nature of the institution. That argument was rejected.
  • Lady Poole went on to make a number of observations, aimed at ensuring that Tribunal cases were not subject to unnecessary delays. These observations are just that, but they are likely to be taken seriously by the Health and Education Chamber.

So, what does this mean?

First, senior pupils in Scotland with additional support needs will be able to access a wider range of schools than was previously thought to be the case – including specialist colleges. Whether a particular institution and course do qualify will depend on the facts of the individual case, with the focus being on the nature of the provision being offered (can it be regarded as secondary education?) rather than on the age of their students or how they are regarded within the English system.

It follows that I refuse the appeal on grounds 1 and 2 advanced by ACC. Both are predicated on the argument that placing requests can only be to schools which provide education for pupils of school age (essentially 5-15 year olds). I do not consider this is a requirement of para 2(2)(b) of Schedule 2 when properly interpreted, for reasons set out above. I consider the approach of the FtT, in reading para 2(2)(b) in the way it did and determining whether that test was met on the evidence, was correct.

Lady Poole, Aberdeen City Council v. ACC [2021] UT 1

Second, we can look forward to potential changes in some Tribunal procedures. For example, it may well be that treating matters as a separate preliminary matter becomes less common. It is also likely that where a review and a request for permission to appeal are lodged at the same time (which is quite common) they should be considered at the same time, rather than one after the other. This should be quite helpful in reducing delays within the Tribunal process.

Image by StockSnap from Pixabay

Case summary – Aberdeenshire Council v. SS and DS (Upper Tribunal for Scotland)

As will be apparent from the decision notice itself, this was one of my cases, with the permission to appeal hearing taking place in the days before lockdown restrictions came into force in Scotland and the Upper Tribunal’s hearings were put on hold.

This is only the second reported decision from the Upper Tribunal for Scotland in an appeal from the Health and Education Chamber.  It is another decision on the specific question of whether permission to appeal should be granted (this arises as a matter for the Upper Tribunal to consider only where the First-tier Tribunal has refused permission).

The case is that of Aberdeenshire Council v. SS and DS [2020] UT 25, an appeal against a decision of the additional support needs Tribunal to require the authority to place the child in question at an independent special school (i.e. a placing request appeal).  The case has already been very well summarised and reported on by clan childlaw here: “Upper Tribunal refuses appeal by Aberdeenshire Council in case concerning placement request for child with additional support needs”.  However, I will make one or two observations in terms of the case’s broader significance, and the issues raised.

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Case summary – Drexler v. Leicestershire County Council (Court of Appeal)

This case was an appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the High Court, rejecting a human rights challenge brought against a change in the SEN transport to school policy of the local authority.  The case was Drexler v. Leicestershire County Council [2020] EWCA Civ 502 and while the appeal was unsuccessful and concerning provisions in English law, it has some useful and interesting points for us to consider.

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Case summary – AD v. London Borough of Hackney (Court of Appeal)

The case of AD v. London Borough of Hackney [2020] EWCA Civ 518 was recently heard by the culinary trio of Lords Justice Bean and Baker, and Mr Justice Cobb at the Court of Appeal.  It is the latest in a series of unsuccessful legal challenges to local authority budget cuts affecting (or potentially affecting) special educational needs provision in England and Wales.

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Case summary – Midlothian Council v. PD (Upper Tribunal for Scotland)

Since the beginning of 2018, further appeals in additional support needs cases go from the Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal for Scotland.  It has taken until now, however, for a case to actually get as far as that and yield a decision for us to look at.  Let us set aside for the moment my own personal disappointment that it was not one of my cases, and the fact that it is only a determination of the question of permission to appeal, and see what the case actually says.

The case in question is Midlothian Council v. PD [2019] UT 52 (PDF) and it is an appeal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland (Health and Education Chamber) to grant a placing request appeal in favour of the appellant (the parent of a child with additional support needs).

Continue reading “Case summary – Midlothian Council v. PD (Upper Tribunal for Scotland)”