The right help at the right time in the right place – consultation response

“Scotland’s Strategy for the Learning Provision for Children and Young People with Complex Additional Support Needs 2017-20206 aims to support improved outcomes for children and young people with complex additional support needs through strategic commissioning of national services; with particular focus on the provision of education. This strategy is based on recommendations made in the Doran Review published in November 2012. While this strategy also recognises the critical role played by social services and health in supporting educational outcomes, the strategy is set within the context of The Additional Support for Learning Act 2004.”

The consultation document sought responses to the proposed strategy for children and young people with complex additional support needs.  Below is my response to the consultation.

Responses are sought to this consultation document. I have prepared some comments based on my knowledge and experience of providing legal representation for the families of children and young people with complex additional support needs.

On page 4, I would suggest using the full title of the Act, i.e. “the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004”.

On page 6, the relevant Act for the criteria for a CSP is the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004, not the 2009 Act.

On p7, the Doran Review specifies an aspiration that services are delivered, where possible, “within the home community” (this is mirrored on p10 – “locally provided”).

The benefits to the child of having services delivered within their community will be many. However, care must be taken that this terminology is not seen as a reason to avoid choosing an out of authority placement for a child who would benefit from that service. It would be useful to set out what is meant by “locally” and “home community” and to stress that it is not shorthand for the specified area of the education authority in question. I have witnessed the argument being made that a child would benefit from being educated in their local community, when the local authority provision in question is many miles from their home. For a child living in Spean Bridge, Inverness is no more their “home community” than Glasgow is.

The Doran Review also specifies an aspiration that services are inclusive (and again on p10). No-one would argue that inclusion is not of benefit to the child. However, care must be taken that the term inclusion or inclusive does not become shorthand for mainstream school. While the presumption of mainstreaming is legally defined in very mechanical terms, of much more importance is the quality of the experience for the child at the provision in question and how that is perceived. How included does the child feel? How inclusive is the school experience for the child and their family?

A child attending a residential special school away from home may experience that as a wholly inclusive setting, whereas a disabled child attending a mainstream school where she is not permitted to attend school trips and is not selected for the sports teams may find that placement to be the opposite of inclusive. The child’s views should be central to this question.

On page 8, the document states “The decision as to the most appropriate interventions and placement lies with the home education authority ..” But should it rest there? There are problems with the current set-up in which the authority determines the child’s placement, unless overruled by a placing request on appeal.

In my opinion, the ideal would be for a system which successfully places at the nationally funded special schools only those children who need it most / would derive most benefit from that placement.

There is a danger with the current arrangements that children are instead placed at such schools for other reasons, for example:
• because their parents are more persuasive, articulate or knowledgeable than those of other children;
• because their parents’ representatives are skilled in making appeals to the education appeal committee or Additional Support Needs Tribunals as the case may be;
• because with the central funding available, the school is cheaper than more appropriate placements in other authority areas / independent sector;
• because the child or family is at crisis point and suitable social work support is not available, the child being placed for respite reasons, rather than educational ones.

A better system, in my view, would be to nationally fund the GASS schools (not necessarily the same ones as at present) in full to provide specialist places for a defined number of children with particular types of complex / severe additional support needs (as determined by the National Strategic Commissioning Group).

The schools themselves, as centres of excellence in their respective fields, would then be able to select the pupils who would most benefit from the places. Without a shortage of places, there would be no disincentive to transition back to the authority’s own schools. With no financial penalty for doing so, authorities would be free to recommend places for children suited for placement based solely on the child’s additional support needs and wellbeing.

Such a system also removes the need for an expensive, time consuming and stressful dispute resolution process which can damage working relationships and take up valuable resources (time, money, energy) which could otherwise be directed by authorities and parents alike to supporting positive outcomes for the child in question.
The Scottish Government already provides 100% capital and revenue funding for one mainstream grant-aided school (Jordanhill School) and there is no reason why it could not do so with (selected) grant-aided special schools. It would be simple to achieve, would not require any legislative changes, and provides savings elsewhere in the system.

In the first instance this could be piloted in relation to a small number of schools or even a single school.

Also of interest in this context are the proposed changes to the structure of Scottish education under the Scottish Government’s governance review. If the education authority are to remain responsible for additional support needs (cf. http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/06/6880/11) while schools acquire new autonomy for the delivery of education and responsibility for closing the attainment gap – then the current system where the authority is basically tied to offering places in its own schools in all but the most extreme cases could be modified.

Does an education authority, responsible for meeting a child’s additional support needs need to be tied to schools in a given area, if all such schools are acting autonomously?

Perhaps an education authority should be given the broader choice of “purchasing” a suitable placement for a child with complex additional support needs, whether that happens to be at a public school, an independent school or a grant-aided school.

On page 10, the Legislative and Policy Context, bullet point 1 should read “Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004”, and bullet point 5 should read “Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014”.

Page 11 mentions a “3 year cyclical commissioning plan” which would allow alignment with education authorities’ accessibility strategies and other planning duties.

Page 12 notes the need for “proactive collaborative working” – but the current system does lead to disputes – better collaboration between grant-aided schools and authorities would be of benefit to pupils, but can be difficult to achieve on the back of a process in which parties are led to criticise the other’s provision.

Page 13 talks about the development of relevant professional learning opportunities, but there is a strong case for professional learning requirements. The Requirements for Teachers (Scotland) Regulations 2005 currently require suitable qualifications for those working wholly or mainly with pupils with a visual impairment, a hearing impairment, or a dual sensory impairment. Why is there no equivalent requirement for, say, those working with pupils who have an autistic spectrum disorder?

On page 14, the need for a strong partnership between parents and providers is noted. It can be difficult to engage with parents for special schools as there are often much larger catchment area, parents with additional caring responsibilities etc. Could the Scottish Schools (Parental Involvement) Act 2006 be extended to include grant-aided special schools, or guidance issued on adopting the same system on a non-statutory basis (which could be made a condition of funding)?

I would also observe that there is a need to maintain strong and ongoing local authority engagement where placements are made at grant-aided special schools, particularly in relation to educational psychology services and at the post-school transition stages.

Iain Nisbet
Education Law Consultant

 

Photo credit: (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Jeremy L. Mosier/Released)

http://www.mountainhome.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/665693/can-we-take-care-of-you/

Transfer of Additional Support Needs Tribunals to First Tier Scottish Tribunal – Consultation Response

The functions and member of the Additional Support Needs Tribunals for Scotland will transfer into the Scottish Tribunals system in January 2018, and become part of the Health and Education Chamber.

As part of this move, Scottish Government have consulted on draft regulations for the rules of the new Tribunals.  Below is my response to that consultation.

Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014

Consultation on Draft Regulations

The First-tier Tribunal for Scotland and Education Chamber (Procedure) Regulations 2017

Part 1

Title of Part 1 currently reads “Part 2” in error.

Rule 1

The definition of “working day” should be revised so as to include days in July.  As things stand the biggest influx of cases to the Additional Support Needs Tribunals are placing requests, which are mostly determined, nationally, at the end of April.  This leads to a large number of references being lodged with the Tribunals during May and June.  By excluding July from calculations of time limits, case statement periods etc. this leads to real difficulties in ensuring that cases of this sort are determined in time for a decision to be taken prior to the start of the new school year, let alone to give any time for a meaningful transition.

While it is acknowledged that there may be difficulties arising from the availability of key personnel and witnesses during the school summer holiday periods, this will not always be the case, and should not automatically be hardwired into the rules.  The Tribunal is able to adjust case statement periods and other deadlines, and to set down hearing dates taking into account the availability of staff / witnesses under other Rules, and the exclusion of July from the calculation of “working days” is not necessary and is prejudicial to the wellbeing of children with additional support needs undergoing transition to nursery, primary or secondary school.

Rule 4

There is no need to distinguish between a lay representative and legal representative.  The current Rules do not do so, and the only practical difference in this set of Rules is that legal representatives cannot be ordered by the Tribunal to cease representing someone, even where they are unsuitable or the interests of justice so require.

Given that the Scottish Government’s policy is to promote the use of lay advocacy (as opposed to legal advocacy) at the Tribunals, it seems odd that the Rules should promote the use of legal representatives in this way.

Rule 5

The proposed role of a supporter in quietly advising on points of law and procedure would seem to be unnecessary in a system where lay representation is permitted, and public funding is available (in both the Tribunal’s jurisdictions) to allow those of limited means to be represented free of charge.

Rule 6

These rules on expenses differ from those currently in place.  In particular, they do not allow for expenses to be awarded whether the original decision or conduct challenged was wholly unreasonable.  The Tribunals have had cause to award expenses on this basis on at least one occasion (cf. https://www.asntscotland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/decisions/ASNTS_D_05_2009_16.07.09.doc) and it does provide the Tribunal the ability to recognise in an award of expenses unreasonable conduct which has led to a reference or claim being required, rather than just unreasonable conduct during the Tribunal procedure itself.

Rule 7

In my view, it is not appropriate for a staff member of the SCTS to carry out the judicial functions of the Tribunal.  Such a staff member would not have been through the requisite appointment process that Tribunal members and legal members have, nor would they necessarily be familiar with the context (additional support needs or disability in education) in which the decision was to be taken.

Rule 9

At present no request for permission is required before an appeal of a decision of the Tribunal is possible.  I am not clear that there is any evidence that there is a need for this kind of barrier to appeals to be introduced.  The number of appeals of decisions of the Additional Support Needs Tribunals every year is very low.  There have been no such appeals reported on the scotcourts.gov.uk website this year.  There was one in 2016, and none in 2014 or 2015.

The law in this area is still relatively underdeveloped and placing further barriers in the way of appeals being progressed could hinder the law’s development and opportunities to clarify the law.

Rule 12

Rule 12 is within Part 1, which are the general provisions, applying both to additional support needs cases and those brought under the Equality Act 2010.  Should there not therefore be an alternative provision allowing the monitoring of First-tier Tribunal decisions which require an independent or grant-aided school to do anything (as a responsible body under the Equality Act 2010)?

There would not necessarily need to be an equivalent to Rule 12(b) in relation to independent or grant-aided schools, but one could be devised where the President might refer such matters to HMIe / Education Scotland.

Part 2

Rule 14

(6) – To comply with a two month deadline in relation to a deemed refusal requires the parent to be aware of the law as it relates to this matter.  In my experience, most parents are not aware of the effects of the Additional Support for Learning (Placing Requests and Deemed Decisions) (Scotland) Regulations 2005.  Particular flexibility needs to be given where parents only become aware of the position at some later stage.

(7) – Where there is an ongoing failure, then the two month deadline should operate as a rolling deadline, i.e. two months from the latest date on which the failure continued.  Otherwise there can be situations where the authority fail to prepare or review a CSP, and continue to fail to do so.  If no reference can be made after two months of failure, then the preparation or review may never be undertaken and the parent has no remedy by way of reference to the Tribunal.

Rule 17

(3) – First mention of the child’s views is here – but the draft Rules do not make any reference to the support service for children to be set up under Section 31A of the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004, which has a specific role in obtaining children’s views in the context of Tribunal proceedings.

Rule 19

(2)(g) – Again, there is no reference to the children’s support service re: child’s views.

(5) – The test to amend the authority’s response is “in exceptional circumstances”, whereas the test found in Rule 39(3) for the authority to rely on grounds not found in its response is the lesser “fair and just to do so” test.  This seems contradictory and potentially encourages a change of tack to be undertaken at a later stage in proceedings, rather than earlier.

Rule 29

(1) – In practical terms, both sides are frequently in the position where the extension of time (particularly) for lodging of documents etc is required.  The Tribunal are good in taking a pragmatic approach to this.  The test of “exceptional circumstances” seems too high.  It is wholly unexceptional for new information to become available in relation to a child’s education during the currency of a Tribunal case.

It also conflicts with the test applied for trying to lodge documents at the start of a hearing (Rule 45) which is “fair and just to do so” – again this potentially encourages parties to delay lodging documents to the day of the hearing, which cannot be a smart idea.

Rule 33

(5)(b) – This provides for expenses of attendance for witnesses called by the parties.  Should there be an equivalent rule to provide for the payment of expenses for witnesses called by the Tribunal under Rules 34 or 35?

(6) The equivalent Rule 85 for claims, specifies that the witness count does not include the claimant themselves.  Is the implication that the two witnesses here do include the appellant and/or the authority’s primary attendee?  If so, this has not been the practice of Tribunals to date.

Rule 35

(2) – The education authority for the area to which the child belongs would not always be the relevant extra authority to call.  The circumstances in which the “home” authority would be needed (and not already the main authority in the case) would be most likely a placing request for an out of authority placement.  The purpose of calling the “home” authority would be that they would know about the child’s current schooling and needs.  However, the child would not necessarily be at a school in their home area.  A child who lives in Glasgow and attends school in East Renfrewshire, whose parents make a placing request for a new school in South Lanarkshire would be ill-served by this rule.  The benefit to the Tribunal would be in being able to call East Renfrewshire, not Glasgow (as this Rule would suggest).

A rewording to allow the Tribunal to call the education authority which is currently (or about to be) responsible for the child’s school education – either instead of or in addition to the current wording would avoid the above problem.

Rule 37

(4)(b) – The implication here is that decisions in cases where there is no hearing must be taken by the legal member alone.  Would it not be preferable for the option to exist for these to be taken by the Tribunal as well?  This would allow access to the non-legal members’ expertise in the field of additional support needs to be applied to the decision in relevant cases.

Rule 38

(7)(c) – Does this mean a supporter in terms of Rule 5?  Or someone in addition to that?  If it is a supporter, that term should be used to avoid confusion.

Should a reference to the children’s support service (s31A, 2004 Act) be explicitly included here?

Rule 39

(3)(b) – Cf. comments on Rule 19(5) earlier.

Rule 43 & 44

Rule 44 should include the power similar to one found in Rule 43 to appoint a suitable person to facilitate the seeking of views of the child.  A reference to the children’s support service (s31A, 2004 Act) would be pertinent here.  The person so appointed should then be added to the list of those permitted to attend a hearing in Rule 38(7).

Part 3

Rule 61

(3) – This rule places the onus on notifying the Equality and Human Rights Commission with the claimant.  Given that many claimants may be unrepresented, this is an easy thing to miss.  It would be better to require the Tribunal to pass a copy of the claim to the Commission.

(4) – There is missing from the six months time limit provisions equivalent to Sections 118(6) and 123(3) of the Equality Act 2010 that “conduct extending over a period” is to be treated as done at the end of that period.  The absence of this potentially leaves those bring claims to the Tribunal at a disadvantage compared with those bringing similar claims to the Civil Courts or Employment Tribunals.

(5) – Section 27 of the Equality Act 2006 has been omitted by virtue of Section 64(1)(b) of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.

Rule 66

(5) – The test to amend the responsible body’s response is “in exceptional circumstances”, whereas the test found in Rule 85(4) for the responsible body to rely on grounds not found in its response is the lesser “fair and just to do so” test.  This seems contradictory and potentially encourages a change of tack to be undertaken at a later stage in proceedings, rather than earlier.

Rule 75

(1) – In practical terms, both sides are frequently in the position where the extension of time (particularly) for lodging of documents etc is required.  The Tribunal are good in taking a pragmatic approach to this.  The test of “exceptional circumstances” seems too high.  It is wholly unexceptional for new information to become available in relation to a child’s education during the currency of a Tribunal case.

It also conflicts with the test applied for trying to lodge documents at the start of a hearing (Rule 90) which is “fair and just to do so” – again this potentially encourages parties to delay lodging documents to the day of the hearing, which cannot be a smart idea.

Rule 83

(4)(b) – The implication here is that decisions in cases where there is no hearing must be taken by the legal member alone.  Would it not be preferable for the option to exist for these to be taken by the Tribunal as well?  This would allow access to the non-legal members’ expertise in the field of disability to be applied to the decision in relevant cases.

Rule 84

(7)(c) – Does this mean a supporter in terms of Rule 5?  Or someone in addition to that?  If it is a supporter, that term should be used to avoid confusion.

Rule 85

(4)(b) – Cf. comments on Rule 66(5) earlier.

Rule 89

Rule 89 does not include an equivalent duty on the Tribunal to that found in Rule 44, i.e. to seek the views of the child (presumably only necessary where the child is not a party to proceedings).  Where this duty is introduced, it should include the power similar to one found here to appoint a suitable person to facilitate the seeking of such views.  A person so appointed should then be added to the list of those permitted to attend a hearing in Rule 84(7).

 

Respondent Information

Iain Nisbet, Education Law Consultant